A Dialogical Account of Logical Pluralism

21 April 2016

MCMP Colloquium, Munich Centre for Mathemtical Philosophy

According to logical pluralists there may be more than one legitimate answer to the question of whether a given deductive argument is valid. Those who wish to defend a pluralist position face a kind of explanatory challenge: how can there be multiple correct notions of logical consequence. In the present talk I will argue that adopting a multi-agent dialogical account of logical consequence allows quite directly for an interesting form of logical pluralism. In order to clarify the position I introduce Prover-Skeptic Games, a novel kind of dialogue game (initially introduced by Sørensen & Urzyczyn in the context of the lambda-calculus) which more closely resembles ‘proof-construction’ rather than ‘formula-evaluation’. We then use these dialogue games to show how interest-relative features of explanation result in an interest-relative form of logical pluralism.