A Dialogical Account of Logical Pluralism

9 September 2016

Melbourne Logic Group

According to logical pluralists there may be more than one legitimate answer to the question of whether a given deductive argument is valid. Those who wish to defend a pluralist position face a kind of explanatory challenge: how can there be multiple correct notions of logical consequence. In the present talk I will argue that adopting a multi-agent dialogical account of logical consequence allows quite directly for an interesting form of logical pluralism. In order to clarify the position I introduce Prover-Skeptic Games, a novel kind of dialogue game (initially introduced by Sørensen & Urzyczyn in the context of the lambda-calculus) which more closely resembles ‘proof-construction’ rather than ‘formula-evaluation’. We then use these dialogue games to show how interest-relative features of explanation result in an interest-relative form of logical pluralism.

  • Slides can be found here